Again the bottom line is the warlords (in the Pentagon) are pitting one group of unemployed young people against another.  American recruiting is going swimmingly as a result of 10 million lost jobs and dismal prospects coming out of high school.  The military offers college money and the chance to move forward a couple of squares, if you don't get your head blown off.  The Taliban is the employer of last resort in Afghanistan, paying $8 -$10 a day to young men who would rather be doing anything else, but whose families are in various states of starvation.  

Another way is possible.  Not more troops and another $3 trillion war, but a modest (compared to $3 trillion for a war) cash-for-work jobs program, paying about $8 a day to potential Taliban fighters, to give them something else to do.  Total cost: less than what we spend in one month on military operations.  This BBC report re-affirms that this not an ideological struggle.  It is an insurgency of our own making.

It is the result of a pissed-away "reconstruction."  40% of funds went to corporate profits for American contractors like Louis Berger Group, which built shoddy schools and clinics.  

Soldiers wishing to refuse deployment can get help from the soldier's war resistor coffee shop and support groups at Under the Hood Cafe at Ft. Hood, Texas.  One plan for Obama to deflate the insurgency by attacking the economic roots is right here, the result of our mission for peace in Afghanistan this summer (film below.)  Sending our unemployed to kill their unemployed is obscene.  No escalation.  Troops out.  Civilian assistance in. This article is being circulated by prominent scholar on Afghanistan and member of the Afghanistan Study Group, Dr. Barnett Rubin.

"I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just"
          - Thomas Jefferson

CALL WHITE HOUSE 202-456-1111/ 202-456-1414

BBC:  Afghans 'blame poverty for war'

Poverty and unemployment are overwhelmingly seen as the main reasons behind conflict in Afghanistan, according to a survey in that country.

"Half our people have been driven mad. A man who is 30 or 40 years old looks like he is 70. We always live in fear. We are not secure anywhere in Afghanistan."

Another man interviewed said: "If people are jobless they are capable of anything."

The survey suggests that many Afghans believe foreign aid does not reach those who need it most.

"Afghan Marshall Plan: Winning With Jobs Not Guns" (short version)

Just indulging in a little fantasy upon the announcement of President Obama rejecting all four of the "options" for Afghanistan given to him by General Stanley McChrystal.  Growing into his commander-in-chief shoes.  We are a fly on the wall in a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Obama (waving papers): "I said options, dammit.  You guys call these options?"  (reads through a few pages.)  "This looks like various proportions of the same old shit.  Stanley, you mean to tell me this is the best you can do?" (General Stanley McChrystal shifts uncomfortably)

McChrystal: "Sir, I..."

(Cuts him off) Obama: "I mean look at this, the 'high-risk' option is 15,000 more troops, running to 'medium risk' at 20,000 more, on up to 'lowest risk' at 60,000.  You all know damned well your own counter-insurgency manual says 20 troops  for every 1,000 inhabitants for a successful operation.  Isn't that what it says?  That's 700,000 troops, which we don't have.

General Number 2:  "Yes, sir, but..."

Obama: "And what about that book has changed between then and now?  Nothing.  So how is 60,000 more troops "low risk?"  (casts his eyes about the room.  No answers.)

McChrystal: "Sir, we're going to be risking failure if we don't go in there with more guys.  We don't want that sir."

Obama: "Stan, it was All Quiet on the Western Front there until four years ago.  Then the suicide bombings started, and the car bombs, and the attacks on our boys, and all you guys are doing is running around the countryside with more bang bang and shoot-em-up.  Now every other boy in Afghanistan is working for the Taliban, at least part time.  Part-time!  (waves a newspaper report)  What the hell is this, Store 24?  It says here no one even likes the Taliban!  What in the hell have you guys been doing over there?"

General Number 3: "You can't believe everything you read, sir."

Obama: "I know that, general, but if this is even a little true then we're missing the boat somewhere."

(Obama paces, looking through reports.  His necktie is loose and his sleeves are rolled up.  He lights up a cigarette)

Obama: "Any of you guys tell Michelle and I'll kill you.  You can smoke em if you got em."  (a couple of other generals light up, the others are not bothered.)

Obama: "Now what about this situation, from relative peace to full-blown chaos, does not constitute failure already, Stanley?  Anybody?  And now you come in here with more of the same of what got us to this point."

(taps at pages in his hand as he speaks)

Obama: "Look at this, 20 percent of the same old shit.  50 percent of the same old shit.  100 percent of the same old shit.  But it's still the same old shit!  Now gentlemen. when I say options, I want some options.  Go in there and do some thinking.  Then come back to me.  This guy Eikenberry, he's one of you right?  Went to West Point and everything, right?  Earned his stars, was former commander of US forces there, right?  Now he comes telling me what I've got here is a pig wearing a gold ear ring.  What is it that he knows that you don't know?"

(The president sits at the head of the table, rubs his forehead a minute.  Folds his hands and leans across the table, looking around the room full bore.  The generals hush.)

Obama: "Fellas, I don't want to be signing thousands of more letters to boys' mamas.  I'm the one who has got to look their mamas in the eye, and watch them coming in at Dover.  When their mamas fall to the floor I am the one who must answer to them was this absolutely necessary.  Now get back there and craft me some options.  Everyone back here at 0300 hours tomorrow morning, that's when my bird lands and I'll be taking off again six hours later.    Don't bring me three donkeys, one in a blue dress, one in white one, and one in a red.  When I say options I mean options."

(President stands.  Officers snap to attention.)

Obama: "One more thing.  I catch one of you guys leaking to the papers about how I've already made up my mind when I haven't, I'll fire his ass.  Understood?"

Generals: "Sir!"

Obama: "Dismissed." (Generals turn to leave.  One officer remains standing, a junior grade attache just back from combat, now assigned to Washington.)

Obama: "Yes, son?"

Soldier, turns directly to Obama: "Sir.  Thank you sir." (salutes.  The president, looking a little puzzled, returns the salute.  Soldier looks down quickly, turns smartly on his heel and exits the room.)

As the president deliberates on exactly how to achieve stability in Afghanistan,  former commander of US forces in Afghanistan General Karl Eikenberry, who was elevated to ambassador by Obama, has called into serious question the wisdom of McChrystal's request for thousands of more troops.  ("U.S. envoy resists increase in troops"- Washington Post)  General Eikenberry fits into the category of Renaissance Soldier, a deep thinker as well as a warrior, who speaks fluent Mandarin, and has a degree in Asian Studies from Harvard and a PhD from Stanford.  

the cables from Eikenberry, a retired three-star general who in 2006-2007 commanded U.S. troops in Afghanistan, have rankled his former colleagues in the Pentagon -- as well as Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, defense officials said...

WaPo also reported:

Eikenberry also has expressed frustration with the relative paucity of funds set aside for spending on development and reconstruction this year in Afghanistan, a country wrecked by three decades of war. Earlier this summer, he asked for $2.5 billion in nonmilitary spending for 2010, a 60 percent increase over what Obama had requested from Congress, but the request has languished even as the administration has debated spending billions of dollars on new troops.

The ambassador also has worried that sending tens of thousands of additional American troops would increase the Afghan government's dependence on U.S. support at a time when its own security forces should be taking on more responsibility for fighting. Before serving as the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Eikenberry was in charge of the Afghan army training program.

Each of the four options that were presented to Obama on Wednesday were accompanied by troop figures and the estimated annual costs of the additional deployments, roughly calculated as $1 billion per thousand troops. All would draw the United States deeper into the war at a time of economic hardship and rising fiscal concerns at home.

No general in command wants fewer troops.  That's just not in their nature.

And in another stunning development indicating Obama reasserting control of his military, reports are that upon looking at the options given to him by war planners, he has said "I don't like any of these" and sent them back to the drawing board.

I am sorry to  to depart from my reportorial tone here folks.  But I have to say this.  Amazing.  Just f-ing amazing.  Ahem.

This comes after White House spokesman Robert Gibbs threw up his arms in exasperation over the sources of reports that Obama had already made up his mind to send 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, first reported by BBC.

AP:  

Gibbs said that anybody who says Obama has made a decision "doesn't have in all honesty the slightest idea what they're talking about. The president's yet to make a decision" about troop levels or other aspects of the revised U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.

Was it highest-level command staff, from Petraeus on down, trying to paint Obama into a corner?  The source would have to be not much less than a four-star, or cabinet level on the civilian side, for the BBC to report it as true.  If that's what was happening, it sure didn't work.

McChrystal's options will cost the US economy anywhere from $40 billion to $60 billion per year, at a time when Obama has announced his desire to hold an American jobs summit.  

The Mother of a Marine Asks Your Help

It is appropriate at this point, I think, to repost an email received a few days ago by members of a large peace network listserve, of which I am a member.  General Eikenberry may be on McChrystal's shitlist, but way down here where we little people live, away from all the intrigue, I am pretty sure that his stepping forward probably brought tears of joy to one mother's eyes, and that to her he is a hero.  Many of us on the listserve know her well.  She wrote to us:

I rarely do this kind of thing because I know we're all assaulted by mass emails, but I really do think we need to keep up the pressure to end this war.  In the interest of full disclosure, I should tell you that my son is an officer in the Marine Corps and is slated to be deployed there this spring and yes, I'm terrified. Anyway, I'd be deeply grateful if you'd click on the link and sign the petition telling Obama not to send more troops to Afghanistan.

Watch Vets tell Obama not to send more troops to Afghanistan then sign the
petition: http://rethinkafghanistan.com/

THANKS,
Kristina

CONTACT WHITE HOUSE: NO ESCALATION IN AFGHANISTAN

A short email received through a peace network's listserve.  The mother, whom I know, is a well-known film documentary producer and progressive activist.  Please find it in your hearts to speak out.

I rarely do this kind of thing because I know we're all assaulted by mass emails, but I really do think we need to keep up the pressure to end this war.  In the interest of full disclosure, I should tell you that my son is an officer in the Marine Corps and is slated to be deployed there this spring and yes, I'm terrified. Anyway, I'd be deeply grateful if you'd click on the link and sign the petition telling Obama not to send more troops to Afghanistan.

Watch Vets tell Obama not to send more troops to Afghanistan then sign the
petition: http://rethinkafghanistan.com/

THANKS,
Kristina

From my time in the country, I promise if this speech is given, there will be fireworks over Kabul and Afghans cheering in the streets at three in the morning.

Fellow Americans,

Today we are at a crossroads in our foreign policy, and in how we respond to the challenges abroad which lay before us.  For too long we have refused to acknowledge mistakes and new ways of thinking, of thinking "outside the box," and there was never a more important time for new thinking than now.  Acknowledging mistakes, and correcting course from those mistakes, is never a sign of weakness.  It is a sign of strength.  Today I have made my decision on how we will proceed in Afghanistan.

The hard fact in Afghanistan is that we need stability, and we need to be assured that this does not become a haven for Al Qaeda.  Now the question is, how do we do this most efficiently, and how do we do this with the least danger to our troops?  Our troops will always accomplish their mission, but how do we as policy makers prepare the ground, diplomatically and economically, to make it possible to accomplish this at the least possible human cost?  These are our sons and daughters, our brothers and sisters, our neighbors. I have promised them I will never send them into harm's way unless it is absolutely necessary, nor into a situation more dangerous than it has to be.   And I'm going to keep that promise.  

We know that in Afghanistan, the Taliban ideology is not popular, and Afghans, the vast majority of them, welcomed the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001.  Let's remember the Taliban shot its way into power after the chaos of many years of civil war, and ruled by force and fear.  Friday night at the National Stadium was execution night, stoning night, and mutilation night.  Today few Afghans want to see the return of the Taliban, just as after World War II, few Europeans in war-torn Western Europe wanted to see communists come into power.  But before the Marshall Plan, extremist ideologies in Europe were making gains nevertheless.  This is because amid the ruins of World War II, hunger and even starvation threatened the continent, and the lure of extremist ideologies promising utopia was strong.  

Fortunately, in the Truman administration, General George C. Marshall, President Truman's Secretary of State, saw the needful, and announced in a Harvard Commencement speech in 1947 the Marshall Plan.  The Marshall Plan was not nation-building, for only the people of a nation can build that nation.  It was a helping hand, designed and implemented for a short duration, at a time when a helping hand was badly needed.  Four years later, Europe was walking on its own, and the world enjoyed an unprecedented period of economic expansion in relative peace.  

Mistakes have been made in Afghanistan, especially as regarding the reconstruction.  Eight years after the overthrow of the Taliban, 35% of Afghans are malnourished according to the UN, and one out of five infants dies before the age of five.  It is one of the most dangerous countries in the world in which to give childbirth, due to lack of basic medical supplies.  Our troops have been doing their jobs, but too many of us, here in Washington, have not done ours.  And as I have been part of Washington since the liberation in 2001, that means me too.  But mistakes can be made right.  A fumbled ball can be recovered.  

In Afghanistan today, too many young men are losing hope.  As in Europe after World War II, some are succumbing to the lure of an extremist ideology.  And with its opium money, acting as the middle man between poor farmers who must feed their families and the world drug trade, the Taliban is able to pay insurgents anywhere from $8 to $10 a day in a country where unemployment is running at 40%, higher in the countryside.  As our former Pentagon spokesman in Afghanistan, Col. Tom Collins said in 2007, "There is a low percentage of the total Taliban force who we  would call ideologically driven. We refer to them as Tier 1 people who  believe their ideology, that what they're doing is right. The vast  majority of Taliban fighters are essentially economically  disadvantaged young men."  And our distinguished Ambassador to Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry, who was the commander of US forces there in 2006 and 2007 told the House Armed Services Committee in 2007 that "much of the enemy force is drawn from the ranks of unemployed men looking for wages to support their families."

Today we announce a new compact with the Afghan people, who will become one of our best and most reliable partners in the struggle against extremism.  To the terrorists, the Taliban high command, and Al Qaeda we continue to say, we will hunt you down.  There is no place to hide.  To the Afghan people who, after 30 years of war and strife, want nothing more than peace and a normal life, building your own country, and feeding your families through hard work, we say, no one can build your country but you.  But we will provide the tools, the technical assistance, and the project funding so that you can feed your families, for a period of time so that the well-known Afghan entrepreneurial spirit can take over.  Your children will have clean water, and you will be able to grow food again after the devastation to your irrigation systems and waterways of 30 years of war, and the path of your growth will be determined by you, as it should be.

There is no shortage of work to be done.  Many of the country's irrigation systems are in shambles.  The country's canals and karezes, which are the traditional and ingenious underground channels which bring water down to a village, are clogged with debris.  There are many, many miles of unsurfaced roads which could benefit from the work of Afghans with hand tools and gravel trucks, which will employ many, many Afghans.  At at the end of each day or week, they will be paid in cash, to use as they see fit.

How will we deliver this aid, this new compact with Afghans which will keep many young men out of the hands of the hated Taliban?  It is too simplistic to say that no part of President Karzai's government works properly. The fact is there are many capable and dedicated Afghan administrators and bureaucrats who work with dedicated and capable foreign technical experts on the evaluation of work projects, even today, which reach the lives of ordinary Afghans.  The problem is not that cash-for-work infrastructure projects cannot work in Afghanistan.  They are working, you can see them today.  The problem is there aren't nearly enough of them.  The task is to take what works, expand on it, and keep trying to fix what doesn't work. Opium farmers will be given other, profitable crops to grow, as well as work, and the base of the enemy's financial power will be destroyed.

Today we recognize the work of the Afghan Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which has created over 22,000 Community Development Councils, which are committees at the village level which include nearly half women, which work with the Ministry and the NSP, the National Solidarity Plan, to determine which projects would be of most value to communities in Afghanistan, and help the most people.  

We will not to tolerate an economically-driven insurgency, just as we will not tolerate one driven by a dark, nihilistic ideology.  When you win a war, you win it by attacking on many levels, not just one.  Plans for work projects, with the input of the Afghan people, will commence immediately, because the hunger will not wait.  I will not tolerate one more American soldier coming under fire by men who fight because, and only because, they have no alternatives.  The cost of this program, which can bring stability, will be modest compared to the cost of a long, protracted war in which we shortsightedly do not address the economic drivers of the renewed insurgency.  

Today we start fresh with the Afghan people, some of the hardiest, most resilient, and most talented people on Earth.  Look it up: Afghans have always placed well in Olympic wrestling, as poor as the nation has always been.  Afghans, after their liberation, recently scaled the nation's highest peak for the first time.  We look forward to the day when the Afghan nation brings to mind not war and strife, but wonderful accomplishments in athletics, in science, and in literature, the latter in which Afghan authors are already becoming distinguished, such as Khaled Hosseini, author of the Kite Runner.  

Failure is not an option.  With Afghanistan firmly embraced in the community of nations, as partners all nations can face the challenges which face us as a planet, as an international community.  Failure is not an option, and the destiny of the Afghan and the American people can only be one thing: friendship.  And this friendship will be the rock upon which the world moves forward. Thank you and God Bless America.

The diarist is the author of "Stabilizing Afghanistan Through a Cash-for-Work Initiative" and co-founder of Jobs for Afghans.
FORWARD POST TO WHITE HOUSE

Excerpts, WaPo yesterday.  Hoh was decorated for "uncommon courage" in Iraq when his helicopter went down and he dove into rushing waters in an attempt to rescue other soldiers.  He writes "we are mortgaging our economy in a war which, even with increased commitment, will remain a draw for years to come."

"Last month, in a move that has sent ripples all the way to the White House, Hoh, 36, became the first U.S. official known to resign in protest over the Afghan war, which he had come to believe simply fueled the insurgency."

"If the United States is to remain in Afghanistan, Hoh said, he would advise a reduction in combat forces."

"Hoh was assigned to research the response to a question asked by Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during an April visit. Mullen wanted to know why the U.S. military had been operating for years in the Korengal Valley, an isolated spot near Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan where a number of Americans had been killed. Hoh concluded that there was no good reason. The people of Korengal didn't want them; the insurgency appeared to have arrived in strength only after the Americans did, and the battle between the two forces had achieved only a bloody stalemate."

Korengal and other areas, he said, taught him "how localized the insurgency was. I didn't realize that a group in this valley here has no connection with an insurgent group two kilometers away." Hundreds, maybe thousands, of groups across Afghanistan, he decided, had few ideological ties to the Taliban but took its money to fight the foreign intruders and maintain their own local power bases.

"That's really what kind of shook me," he said. "I thought it was more nationalistic. But it's localism. I would call it valley-ism."

The reaction to Hoh's letter was immediate. Senior U.S. officials, concerned that they would lose an outstanding officer and perhaps gain a prominent critic, appealed to him to stay.

U.S. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry brought him to Kabul and offered him a job on his senior embassy staff. Hoh declined. From there, he was flown home for a face-to-face meeting with Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

"We took his letter very seriously, because he was a good officer," Holbrooke said in an interview. "We all thought that given how serious his letter was, how much commitment there was, and his prior track record, we should pay close attention to him."

While he did not share Hoh's view that the war "wasn't worth the fight," Holbrooke said, "I agreed with much of his analysis." He asked Hoh to join his team in Washington, saying that "if he really wanted to affect policy and help reduce the cost of the war on lives and treasure," why not be "inside the building, rather than outside, where you can get a lot of attention but you won't have the same political impact?"

Hoh accepted the argument and the job, but changed his mind a week later. "I recognize the career implications, but it wasn't the right thing to do," he said in an interview Friday, two days after his resignation became final.

Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., Ambassador Eikenberry's deputy, said he met with Hoh in Kabul but spoke to him "in confidence. I respect him as a thoughtful man who has rendered selfless service to our country, and I expect most of Matt's colleagues would share this positive estimation of him, whatever may be our differences of policy or program perspectives."

This week, Hoh is scheduled to meet with Vice President Biden's foreign policy adviser, Antony Blinken, at Blinken's invitation.

American families, he said at the end of the letter, "must be reassured their dead have sacrificed for a purpose worthy of futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept. I have lost confidence such assurances can be made any more."  FULL ARTICLE HERE

Contact congress here, "No troop escalation"

View your congressman's out-of-district military contractor campaign contributions here.

This unpublished UN document has come into my possession as director of the Afghan Marshall Plan Exit Strategy Project, dated June of this year.  I can only say it was leaked to us through our contacts in Kabul.  In it, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has in great detail marked the way for a civilian solution in Afghanistan, as President Obama considers throwing more military at the problem.  UNAMA is the cream of the international development corps, with depth and range of expertise in both war zones and peaceful environments.  In this paper the Mission staff clearly delineates the goal of "reduc[ing] support to the insurgency."

The Afghan New Deal will be a mass employment programme concentrating on regenerating rural infrastructure, particularly irrigation systems but its raison d'etre will be to build stability and reduce support to the insurgency.

The programme will focus on fighting age males (a wide age range) during the fighting season (which has been getting longer) and should last not less than three years.

Here is the answer to the terrible choice the president faces in deciding whether or not to send in more troops. The cost would be small fraction of military operations.  It is based on the considered opinion of the world's foremost development experts, representing combined decades of working in combat zones.  Please forward this post and the link to this document to the White House.  Sometimes war is the answer.   But this time it is not.

Contact the White House

Full document "The Afghan New Deal" posted here.

The Afghan New Deal (excerpted)

UNAMA SER is of the view that one of the best means of tackling the growing insurgency in the southeast is to put in place a massive public works programme, employing tens of thousands of fighting age males during the fighting season. For want of a better title, we are calling it the `Afghan New Deal' programme at this point.

The Afghan New Deal will involve all entities of sub-national governance and tribal authorities, thus strengthening linkages between them on the basis of interdependence.

The Afghan New Deal should focus on technologically simple infrastructure projects employing large numbers of fighting age men. The obvious types of projects include restoring irrigation systems, building flood mitigation infrastructure, gravel roads and forestry management.

Planning and preparation for such a programme should take place during the winter so that it commence in spring, before the fighting season starts. The process underlying this programme is in itself tremendously important.

Unemployment and under-employment are very high in the southeast region. This is a major cause of dissatisfaction with the Government and international community and consequent support for the insurgency and also a cause of criminality. Insurgents can pay young unemployed men to carry out attacks for them.

Many parts of the region have enjoyed only minimal development during the past seven years. Development has been patchy. Although there may be no proven causal link between development and security, the districts which are the most insecure (southern and eastern Ghazni, Zurmat and much of Paktika) have also enjoyed little development. However, it is possible that insecurity has dissuaded civilian organisations and even PRTs from operating there. There is a general disillusionment with the international community on the basis of what is seen as failed promises.

There is widespread poverty and the ability of communities to respond to shocks such as the food price rises or natural disasters is limited.

The southeast relies predominately on agriculture. Much of the region is mountainous and has little arable land. Overgrazing is a real problem in the mountains. In the plains areas, there is ample arable land but insufficient irrigation.

Nationally, it is estimated that only a third as much land is irrigated as was the case in 1979. The Soviets targeted the irrigation infrastructure in an attempt to depopulate areas and to prevent mujahidin fighters from using the underground irrigation channels known as karezes to move around. These systems have never been properly restored.

Consequently the lack of irrigation water and irrigation systems is the greatest constraint on agricultural yields and by extension on improving the economic status of people in the southeast.

The Afghan New Deal will be a mass employment programme concentrating on regenerating rural infrastructure, particularly irrigation systems but its raison d'être will be to build stability and reduce support to the insurgency.

The programme will focus on fighting age males (a wide age range) during the fighting season (which has been getting longer) and should last not less than three years.

Each unskilled worker should be paid around $6 per full day of work.

The programme offers a holistic and comprehensive approach, not piecemeal, and should aim for blanket coverage of the region, covering all communities and not pockets here and there.

A Provincial Management Team will be established to manage the Afghan New Deal within the province. This will be headed by the Provincial Governor and comprise the heads of relevant departments (DoRRD, DAIL, DoPW), the Chief of Police and include donor representatives and UNAMA.

The programme will depend on the Community Development Committees (or village shuras where the NSP has not been implemented, but called CDCs within this paper), and will involve all entities of sub-national governance.

All participating CDCs will continually implement discrete projects for the entirety of the fighting season. The scope of the projects will be defined from the outset, as is the case for the NSP, and may include: rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, gravel road construction, construction of flood retaining walls, reforestation projects and construction of micro-hydro and/or hybrid electrical general schemes.

Another important criteria for Afghan New Deal projects is that the budget is at least 60% local labour costs and that the asset created requires no operational tashkeel or takhsis from the Government.

A District Engineering Team will be established in each district, attached to the district administration, but also under the overall management of the provincial Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. The purpose of the District Engineering Team is to provide technical assistance and oversight of the projects implemented by the CDCs. The District Engineering Team could be a commercial firm or an NGO under contract to the DoRRD, but will comprise around ten Afghan engineers and construction specialists and ten less skilled staff.

CDCs will identify appropriate projects and outline a basic proposal which they will submit to the District Development Assembly.

The Afghan New Deal could employ 40,000 people in Paktya (perhaps as much as 7% of the population) for a little over $72 million per year.

A programme of this magnitude would require the support of the highest levels of the Afghan Government, ISAF and major donors and would therefore require extensive discussion and consultation.

Reliable and adequate funding will be necessary for at least three years. Donors would have to make firm commitments.

If there is to be any chance of putting in place this programme before the next fighting season, there is a lot of work to be done. Political outreach with CDCs and tribal shuras so that they understand the programme and undertake to support it.

Forward to your congressmember with your comments

The Afghan Marshall Plan Exit Strategy Project

The writer is co-founder of Jobs for Afghans.

Using an online Excel spreadsheet like a whip list to continually update congress members' positions on the troop escalation, sister peace organization United for Peace and Justice is enlisting citizens to report results of phone calls to their offices to keep the heat on.   This is a bold and creative undertaking in using the Netroots to stop a war.  Jump in and report your call to your congressman on the website NoEscalation.org.  The whip list is updated every five minutes.

Also don't forget the brave Afghan women's activist Zoya (of RAWA.org, who is on a US speaking tour right now) and her plea for help in stopping the starvation now taking place in Afghanistan among its children, including in Kabul.  Demand during your calls that Congress heed RethinkAfghanistan.org's call for a civilian solution.  One important part of a civilian solution is detailed here, at "Afghan Marshall Plan: an Exit Strategy."  You can email the link or the text to your representatives.

Since there is 40% unemployment and the Taliban pays its fighters $8 a day, denying civilian aid could be the military-industrial complex's recipe for further instability and war, to use the term coined by Republican President Dwight Eisenhower in a warning in his Farewell Speech.  Now that Obama has won the Nobel Peace Prize, he would do well to remember who else won that prize, George C. Marshall author of the Marshall Plan, which fed starving Europeans and stabilized Europe after WWII.  Troops out.  Civilian assistance in.  This is a manufactured war in which most Taliban recruits would drop their weapons if they had work projects instead, which would cost us a tiny fraction of what is spent on military operations.

From the sister peace website NoEscalation.org:

We need Members of Congress to take a stand against escalation now.

There are three key ways for Members of the House to affect President Obama’s decision: to speak out publicly against a troop increase; to co-sponsor Rep. Lee’s bill HR 3699 prohibiting an increase in troops; and to co-sponsor Rep. McGovern’s bill HR 2404 calling for an exit strategy from our military occupation of Afghanistan.

There are two key ways for Senators to affect President Obama’s decision: to speak out publicly against a troop increase and to introduce legislation in opposition to a troop increase and in favor of an exit strategy from our military occupation of Afghanistan or in favor of a timetable for military withdrawal.

So, what we are asking you to do is call your representatives in Congress – or any Member of Congress you feel comfortable calling (all phone numbers are given in the spreadsheet below – click on the spreadsheet and use arrows to scroll up and down – click the second tab for the Senate – or you can just call the switchboard at 202-225-3121 and be transfered to the Rep or Senator’s office) – try to get a staff person who handles Afghanistan on the phone, and:

for Members of the House: 1) if their office has not co-sponsored the McGovern bill (current co-sponsors are shown in the spreadsheet below), ask them to co-sponsor it.

2) if their office has co-sponsored the McGovern bill but not the Lee bill, ask them to co-sponsor the Lee bill.

3) if they are not shown in the list below as having taken a position against sending more troops, ask them if they have taken a position against sending more troops; and urge them to take a position now against sending more troops. (Here is a script for calling House Members.)

for Senators: 1) ask them if they have taken a position against sending more U.S. troops. If they have not done so, ask them to take a position now against sending more U.S. troops.

2) ask them to introduce legislation in opposition to sending more troops and in favor of an exit strategy from our occupation from Afghanistan or in favor of a timetable for military withdrawal. (Here is a script for calling Senators. )

Then – this is important – we want you to report your results on this website — what did the office say? – using the comments section for this blog, so people around the country can see who has taken a stand and who has not.Tell us if these Members of Congress have taken a stand against sending more U.S. troops. Click on the comment link to add your reportback. If the Congressional office directs you to a website or press clips that documents the Representative’s position, or you come across such links, please post the URLs in your reportbacks.

The groups organizing this project want to end the war. But the first step to ending the war is not to deepen it. If McChrystal’s request is approved, it will likely lengthen the war by many years. Thank you for participating! Please spread the word by spreading this URL: http://noescalation.org!

Watch the 26 minute documentary online "Afghan Marshall Plan: Winning With Jobs Not Guns"